This point was echoed by a series of nineteenth-century European visitors to America who used explicitly economic terms and the principle that competition creates vigorous organizations to explain the vitality of religion in this country. Summing up generations of work on "American exceptionalism," Edward Tiryakian (1993:45) noted that 'there is a consensus that religion is usually better off, in terms of its social vitality, in societies where it is not a state-regulated monopoly." Modern economists regard this view as fundamental. Having pointed out that "the economic approach is not restricted to material goods and wants," Gary S. Becker (1976:6) noted that one of its most central theorems is that "competitive markets satisfy consumer preferences more effectively than monopolistic markets, be it the market for aluminum or the market for ideas." We shall have more to say about the weaknesses of "monopoly" faiths after developing several other propositions. Prop. 5: To the degree that a religious firm achieves a monopoly, it will seek to exert its influence over other institutions and thus the society will be sacralized.
By sacralized we mean that the primary aspects of life, from family to politics, will be suffused with religious symbols, rhetoric, and ritual.
Sacralization is a familiar phenomenon that evokes images of annual ceremonies when priests bless the fishing fleet, of classrooms dominated by a crucifix, and especially of religious ceremonies intrinsic to the public, political spheres of life. Leaders of monopoly faiths often lend their presence to public political occasions and ceremonies. Moreover, in such societies political leadership itself often will have a distinctly religious hue.
Close ties between religion and politics are well known: Religious elites often have ratified claims by political elites that their power has divine sanction. What we are attempting here is to formulate more precisely this relationship. Sacralization of the political sphere is the quid pro quo by which a particular religious firm enlists the coercive powers of the state against competing firms.
Prop. 6: To the degree that deregulation occurs in a previously highly regulated religious economy, the society will be desacralized.
When the state, for whatever reasons, no longer recognizes claims of exclusive legitimacy by the monopoly faith, desacralization must ensue. Where there is a plurality of religious firms, no one of them is sufficiently potent to sustain sacralization.4 Nor can sacralization be sustained by some coalition of competing religious firms, for any statements emitted by such a group must be limited to vague generalizations to which all can assent. Perhaps such is the stuff of "civil religion" (Bellah 1967), but it is not the stuff of sacralization. But, then, neither is it necessarily a symptom of religious decline.
In our judgment, many scholars mistakenly interpret desacralization as secularization, thus linking a decline in influence of an erstwhile monopoly firm to a decline in religious influence in general. Indeed, European studies of secularization routinely begin with a definition equivalent to our definition of desacralization.5 Next, the authors demonstrate that these changes have taken place (as indeed they have). But then, in their conclusions, many of these writers suddenly shift their terms to identify secularization as loss of personal faith in religion. This absence of any link between the data examined and the final conclusions disqualifies much of the scholarly basis for claims about secularization in Europe. That is, observers have noted the dismantling of some European religious monopolies and have associated this with a massive and lasting decline in the extent and depth of religious commitment among members of these societies. Quite aside from the empirical omissions of this argument, there are rather strong theoretical objections to it. Propositions 3 and 4 assert that any declines in personal piety accompanying desacralization, should they in fact occur, ought to be temporary and that as more firms (and more motivated firms) gain free access to the market, levels of individual religious commitment ought to increase.
Keep in mind that there will be a lag between the onset of desacralization and the rise of a vigorous religious pluralism. Thus, although the Roman Catholic Church, for example, has been stripped of its monopoly standing and much of its temporal power in many parts of 4. This may well be the reason that sociologists regard religious monopolies as the basis for strong faith and pluralism as inevitably eroding faith. If Peter Berger's notion of the "sacred canopy" is equated with the sacralization of societies, then it is true that a single canopy is necessary, and that multiple canopies don't suffice. But, when the sacred canopy line of thought is construed to mean that personal piety is more abundant under monopoly faith, that is clearly wrong.
5. We must acknowledge that this is how the dictionary defines secularization as well.
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Europe and Latin America, this did not immediately create unregulated religious economies filled with eager firms competing for souls. Considerable desacralization will tend to occur before there is sufficient pluralism to greatly increase religious participation. Thus, over the short term, desacralization can give the appearance of secularization. We must emphasize, however, that this sort of "secularization" is temporary and largely limited to a decline in religious participation -it never is the "extinction" of religion proposed by the standard theories of secularization.
Many factors can slow the development of vigorous pluralism. For one thing, deregulation of a religious economy often is more apparent than real. The government may announce a policy of religious freedom, or at least of religious toleration, but continue to grant special privileges and financial aid to the traditional monopoly firm, while imposing many hindrances upon new firms. Fully developed pluralism can thus be distorted and delayed by de facto establishment. In Scandinavia, for example, the Lutheran clergy are civil servants and do not depend upon satisfied customers for their support.
In addition, cultural inertia (tradition) will delay the acceptance of new firms as normal and legitimate. The stigmas attached to its competitors by the old monopoly faith will linger. For example, despite the easing of offlcial policies restricting Protestant activities in most of Latin America, Protestant clergy and converts are still very frequently victims of assault and even murder (Stoll 1990; Martin 1990) . Similarly, although the Jehovah's Witnesses finally gained legal status in Italy through a series of ministerial decrees in the late 1970s, they have continued to be the occasional victims of mob violence.6
Another cause of delay in the development of pluralism is that, to the extent that new firms are branches of outside firms, their success must await the development of social ties between missionaries and locals. Network ties must exist or be created in order for religious firms to attract members (Lofland and Stark 1965; Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 1987). Thus, for example, American Evangelical Protestant missionaries have been active in Latin America for decades, but growth was extremely slow until after World War II, when the primary missionary work was progressively taken over by local converts. Subsequently, growth has been so rapid that by now Evangelical Protestant bodies claim very substantial followings in most of the continent -in many nations Protestants now make up the majority of those actually in church on Sunday (Stoll 1990; Martin 1990).
Finally, it must be recognized that much of the "decline" in consumer commitment that accompanies desacralization is illusory. Monopoly churches always manage to appear vastly more popular and pervasive than they actually are. A major effect of desacralization in Europe and Latin America may have been to reveal widespread apathy, rather than reflect a decline in piety. Keep in mind, too, that monopolists always claim that should they be dislodged, religious life will suffer (and social scientists have been too quick to believe them).
Prop. 7:
The relationship between the degree of regulation of the religious economy and start-up costs for new religious organizations is curvilinear -declining as the state exerts less coercion on behalf of a monopoly firm, but rising again as fully developed pluralism produces a crowded marketplace of effective and successful firms.
Start-up costs consist of the resources (human as well as material) that must be expended before a firm becomes self-sustaining. There are two rather independent sources of start-up costs that new religious firms must overcome. The first stems from repression. When the state seeks out and punishes heretics, it is very costly to compete with the official 6. Before legalization, the police frequently broke up private gatherings of Witnesses and there were many ugly incidents involving mob violence, sometimes led by local priests. church. As the state becomes lax and fails to act on complaints of heresy, start-up costs decline and new religions proliferate. But, as religious deregulation continues and the number of competitors increases, successful entry becomes more difficult and less profitable.7 Indeed, in such a situation new firms will enter the economy primarily through the process of sect formation and new sects will succeed only to the extent that the fervor of some established firms has eroded, leaving an opening in the market.
EUROPE'S REGULATED AND MONOPOLIZED RELIGIOUS ECONOMIES
Although it is abundantly clear that an immense amount of desacralization has occurred in much of Europe, especially in the Protestant North, it is equally clear that unregulated and pluralistic religious economies are, at best, only beginning to appear. In most of these nations, and especially in those counted as among the most secularized, religious subsidies and regulation, both official and de facto, continue to distort and stunt the religious marketplace. Let us examine some typical situations. In 1970 Spain passed a religious toleration act, giving non-Catholics the right to hold services. In 1992 the Spanish government extended tax exempt status to a federation of evangelical Protestant groups, gave them the right to organize schools, and recognized "Protestant minister" as a legal profession. However, these new rights were not extended to Protestant groups that were not part of the federation, nor to non-Christians (Miller 1991).
7. This is an application of microeconomics' "zero profit theorem," which states that entry into a competitive market will continue until all opportunities for profit are exhausted. We acknowledge that religious firms typically are "nonprofit," but the theorem applies if one assumes that "profit" in this instance means the capacity to attract sufficient followers and resources to be self-sustaining. The Swedish clergy are well paid and have civil service job security. Indeed, the archbishop's salary is nearly as high as that of the prime minister. Not surprisingly, the Church of Sweden suffers from high costs and low productivity. Typically, Sunday services in huge cathedrals able to seat many hundreds, even thousands, of people are attended by a handful of individuals. These tiny congregations are served by large staffs. In the end, "only a very small fraction of capacity is ever utilized" (Rydenfelt 1985).9
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One might suppose that Sweden's Social Democratic Party would have managed by now to dismantle or disestablish the Church. With its original atheistic ideology, the Party 9. One of our friends, an American Lutheran minister, had the following experience at the Cathedral of Stockholm many years ago. He went there to attend Sunday services and found himself in a huge structure, surrounded by a mere handful of fellow worshippers. At the of the service, he spoke to the priest, who bemoaned the paucity of worshipers, and described the large, professional staff attached to the Cathedral. Our friend remarked, "But surely, the staff and their family alone should have made up a much larger audience." The Priest replied, 'Yes, but they work so hard all week. They like to take Sunday off." Through all this, the spiritual mission of the church has received little attention. The clergy do not complain of a lack of members, since "everybody" belongs, nor are they concerned for a lack of contributions -their civil service salaries are secure. However, the indifference of the Lutheran clergy does not extend to potential competitors. Thus, although Sweden permits other faiths to operate, it is not really true that they enjoy complete religious freedom, despite being called "free churches." For example, evangelical Protestant groups often find it difficult to get the proper permits to qualify a building as suitable for public meetings and to otherwise deal with a state bureaucracy that has no sympathy for unnecessary challenges to state Lutheranism. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the free churches enroll only one tenth of the population, most Swedes in church on any Sunday attend the free churches -which often turn out 70% of their members (Barrett 1982: 649).
Elsewhere in Scandinavia similar conditions prevail. Peter Lodberg (1989:7), General Secretary of the Ecumenical Council in Denmark, noted that "Parliament still has the absolute power in the Administration of the National Church [the Evangelical Lutheran Church]." As an example, he pointed out that Parliament had passed a law authorizing female pastors in the state church over the opposition of all but one of the bishops. Lodberg commented:
It is characteristic that this question was not seen as a matter of the inner life of the church, but as something concerning the administrative system of the National Church, that is, it was regarded as being an issue for Parliament rather than the bishops. Chaves and Cann's coding clearly shows the general lack of free-market religious economies in Europe. Only two of the major European nations -Ireland and the Netherlands -score on a par with the United States, and questions can be raised about even these two cases. In our judgment, the Netherlands should be scored as substantially more regulated.11 As for Ireland, we do not dispute that it should be scored zero on this index, but we must note that this is a very recent change that could not yet be expected to have any noticeable impact on pluralism. Article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, adopted in 1937, acknowledged that "public worship is due almighty God," and noted the "special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as guardian of the faith," and prohibited the state from legalizing divorce. A special referendum in 1972 abolished Article 44. The elimination of legal ties between church and state is a major step toward a free market religious economy and the eventual emergence of vigorous pluralism. In accord with our propositions, however, de facto regulation will linger for a while and pluralism will not arise overnight.
PRELIMINARY TESTS OF THE THEORY
If we are correct about the impact of pluralism and regulation on the vigor of religious firms and therefore on the overall levels of religious participation in societies, then we ought to be able to use measures of the former to explain variations in the latter.
A first attempt to test such hypotheses was based on 14 European nations, plus Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States (Iannaccone, 1991). Pluralism was measured with a classic index of market concentration (the Herfindahl Index) and rates of weekly church attendance operationalized religious participation. Regression results proved very strong, with pluralism accounting for more than 90% of the variation in church atten-11. According to Barrett (1982:512) (Chaves and Cann's primary source) the state does have the right of approval over at least some church leaders: "state approval is required when a church confers an ecclesiastical office on an expatriate." Moreover, the state directly pays the salaries of at least some church personnel. For example, the state pays faculty in the theological seminaries operated by the nation's three leading denominations, and the "state also meets supplementary costs relating to professional posts for training ministers of other communities." Further, the state subsidizes parochial schools and has sometimes paid subsidies of up to 30% for church construction. This would not seem to be an entirely unregulated religious economy in the American mode, albeit the Netherlands'seconomy is far less regulated than those of Scandinavia. dance.12 Moreover, the United States is not a deviant case, but lies close to the regression line -its unusually high rate of weekly church attendance is consistent with its highly developed pluralism -and has a Herfindahl Index score of 12 as compared with Denmark's score of 94 (the higher the score, the less pluralism).
A second test of the theory focused on Catholicism (Stark 1992). Based on 45 nations within which the Roman Catholic Church is active, the paper tested the proposition that the level of commitment of the average Catholic varies across nations inversely to the proportion of Catholics in the population. That is, the Catholic Church will be more effective in mobilizing its members where it is confronted either by pluralistic religious economies or by Protestant semimonopolies and will be least effective where it most closely approximates a monopoly. Other research had demonstrated the validity of the number of priests per 10,000 nominal Catholics as a measure of member commitment (Stark and McCann 1993). The correlation between priests and the percent nominally Catholic was -.73. Suitable controls did not reduce the correlation.
A third test of the theory operationalized the concept of regulation as described above (Chaves and Cann 1992). The data were limited to the same 18 nations used by Iannaccone (1991). The findings were that regulation strongly predicted church attendance rates: The more regulation, the less attendance.
Three additional tests of the theory explored the impact of pluralism within societies. Using data based on American cities in 1906, Finke and Stark (1988) found a very strong relationship between religious diversity (measured by the Herfindahl Index) and rates of church membership. Subsequently, Land, Deane, and Blau (1991) used religious census data from early in the century to examine pluralism and church membership rates for the counties of the United States, and claimed to have discovered support for the traditional position that pluralism harms religious commitment. What their data actually showed was a positive effect of pluralism for the urban counties and a negative effect limited to the rural counties. However, all findings based on the rural counties are questionable because of severe measurement problems.13 In the instance at hand, church membership statistics for the rural counties are very inaccurate, because all members of a given congregation are assigned to the county in which the church is located. Consequently, some counties have membership rates far above 100 percent and others have no members, since farmers often cross county boundaries to attend church. These problems are minimized in urban counties, and hence only the positive urban results obtained by Land, Deane, and Blau are trustworthy.
A third study, by Hamberg and Pettersson, included in this issue, is based on 284 municipalities of Sweden and also uses the Herfindahl Index to measure the diversity not only of denominations, but also of Sunday services, and again found huge effects on rates of attendance. This study is of particular interest because the low levels of church attendance and the quite limited pluralism found in Sweden minimized variation -and still robust findings turned up.
Finally, a study based on 198 nations found a huge, positive effect of pluralism on rates of religious conversion or religious switching (Duke, Johnson, and Duke 1993). Granted, one would not expect much religious switching where few alternatives are available, although in principle there could be as much switching where there are only two faiths as where there are 192. One also would expect little switching where it is illegal to change faiths, as in many Islamic nations. However, religious switching also can be interpreted as a 12. The six European nations in which more than 80% of the population are nominally Catholic were excluded from the analysis.
13
. As an additional example of these problems, many counties have far more than 100% of their land classified as under cultivation because when farms cross county lines the entire farm is assigned to the county having the larger portion.
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measure of religious activity within societies -that where conversion rates are high, significant numbers of people have been activated to the extent that they are willing to take the relatively dramatic action of embracing a faith in which they were not raised.
Thus, the available data support the supply-side insight that where regulation stifles competition among religious firms, religious participation also is stifled. Put another way, where people are not confronted with a range of efficient religious suppliers, low levels of religious consumption exist.
Unfortunately, for many sociologists, their commitment to secularization is such that even when they seem to fully recognize the supply-side explanation they are unable to follow it to its logical conclusions. In a recent paper, Frank J. Lechner (1991:1111) seemed to echo our position:
In a society with a tradition of revivalism and an open religious marketplace, where new enterprises can be started easily and legitimately and where religious choice and change by individuals are socially legitimate, revivals and innovation are indeed to be expected. But nothing similar is to be found in most Western European countries.
However, rather than pursue this line of reasoning by asking what might happen if European religious economies were deregulated so that they could more closely approximate the American situation, Lechner was content to have thus "explained" American exceptionalism and thereby to have defended the view that the European situation can only change in the direction of ever greater secularization.
In any event, several questions must be answered if our theory is to gain even provisional plausibility. Even if we are correct about why religious participation is so low in many of these nations, the fact remains that it is low. Does it not follow that these societies meet Wilson's definition of secularization -places where religious institutions, actions, and consciousness have lost their social significance? And why are religious monopolies only weak today? How can a supply-side approach account for the powerful religious monopolies of times past? We now address these questions.
MASS PIETY IN SACRALIZED SOCIETIES
Everyone knows that religion has crumbled since medieval times when all Europe walked secure in faith and grace. Indeed, the presumed universal piety during medieval Europe's "Age of Faith" constitutes the primary benchmark against which scholars measure modern secularization. Thus medieval times stand as a major challenge to a supply-side theory of religious activity. After all, these were sacralized societies wherein the state supported efforts to monopolize the religious economy -they should have been notable for religious indifference, not for universal piety.
We think it significant that we first formulated our theory before we knew that in recent years a number of religious historians have assembled evidence that the medieval masses were, in fact, remarkably irreligious, at least in terms of religious participation, just as the theory predicts (Thomas 1971; Johnson 1976; Delumeau 1977; Schneider 1990; Gentilcore 1992). Andrew Greeley (forthcoming) has summarized these historical conclusions with characteristic succinctness:
There is no reason to believe that the peasant masses of Europe were ever very devout Christians, not in the sense that we usually mean when we use these words. There could be no deChristianization as the term is normally used because there was never any Christianization in the first place. Christian Europe never existed.
The celebrated medieval piety might have characterized the nobility, but religious participation among the medieval populace seems to have been very low. Jean Delumeau
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(1977) has concluded that the middle ages weren't even Christian in any meaningful sense of the term, but that the peasants were simple spirit worshippers whose folklore included some Christian content. Similarly, Jane Schneider (1990) described the religion of medieval Europe as "animism," noting that Christian saints made up only a portion of the supernatural creatures with whom the peasants bartered for protection and favor. The reason for this state of affairs was that the peasants were essentially ignored by the medieval Church which, according to Greeley (forthcoming), lacked the resources "and perhaps the motivation to catechize (if that be the appropriate word for the time) the peasant masses." As Paul Johnson (1976:228-229) noted, the Church typically made little or no effort to reach the peasantry, at a time when nearly everyone was a peasant:
The truth is that the Church tended to be hostile to the peasants. There were very few peasant saints. Medieval clerical writers emphasize the bestiality, violence and avarice of the peasant. We get few glimpses of peasant life in the documents ... [the church] was increasingly an urban phenomenon. . . it was rare to see a priest in the country districts.
Max Weber (1961:1139) also noted that "the churches of the Middle Ages" held an "extremely derogatory" attitude towards the peasants.
In their study of popular religion during the Middle Ages, Rosalind and Christopher Brooke (1984:116) noted that an extensive survey of surviving parish churches across Europe revealed the typical church to be "a small box with a tiny chancel, the whole being no larger than a moderately large living room in a modern house." The Brookes emphasize the intimacy this made possible between priest and parishioners during mass, but these tiny churches are also indicative of widespread indifference. Given that most medieval parishes covered a substantial area, it would have been impossible to cram more than a small fraction of the population into such quarters.
In his classic work, Religion and the Decline of Magic, the British historian Keith Thomas (1971:159) noted that in late medieval times "it is problematical as to whether certain sections of the population [of Britain] at this time had any religion at all" and "that many of those who did [go to church] went with considerable reluctance." When the common people did show up in church, often under compulsion, they so misbehaved "as to turn the service into a travesty of what was intended" according to Thomas (1971:161) . Presentations before ecclesiastical courts and scores of clerical memoirs report how "members of the population jostled for pews, nudged their neighbours, hawked and spat, knitted, made coarse remarks, told jokes, fell asleep, and even let off guns" (Thomas 1971:161). Church records tell of a man in Cambridgeshire who was charged with misbehaving in church in 1598 after his "most loathsome farting, striking, and scoffing speeches" had resulted in "the great offence of the good and the great rejoicing of the bad" (quoted in Thomas 1971:162). A man who issued loathsome farts in church today surely would not draw cheers from part of the congregation in any British church, not even if he accompanied his efforts with scoffing speeches.
But it wasn't only the masses who failed to measure up to our cherished image of medieval piety. In 1551 the Bishop of Gloucester systematically tested his diocesan clergy. Of 311 pastors, 171 could not repeat the Ten Commandments and 27 did not know the author of the Lord's Prayer (Gairdner, quoted in Thomas 1971:164). Similarly, in 1547 Archbishop Giovanni Bovio, of the Brindisi-Oria diocese in southern Italy, found that most of his priests "could barely read and could not understand Latin" (Gentilcore 1992:42). Moreover, the majority kept concubines, and had fathered children and complaints of sexual improprieties on the part of priests, including rape and adultery, were rife. In fact, many priests failed to perform their pastoral duties -"there were often no priests to celebrate mass or perform extreme unction" (Gentilcore, 1992:42).
As Europe passed out of medieval times, religious participation seems not to have improved -however, the statistics on religious behavior do. Some of the best of these can be found in the reports written by various Anglican Bishops and Archbishops following lengthy visitation trips to their parishes. Thus the Oxford Diocesan Visitations report that 30 parishes in Oxfordshire drew a combined total of 911 communicants in 1738, based on the four "Great Festivals" -Easter, Ascension, Whitsun, and Christmas. This turnout amounted to far less than five percent of the total population of these parishes. Other Visitation reports yield similarly low rates of participation in communion over the remainder of the eighteenth century (Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley 1977). Indeed, Peter Laslett (1965) reported that only 125 of 400 adults in a particular English village took Easter communion late in the eighteenth century. He went on to note "much smaller attendances" in other villages. Incredibly, Laslett uses these data to demonstrate the unanimity of faith in this era14 -the title of his book is The World We Have Lost. Were these twentieth-century statistics, they would be cited routinely as proof of massive secularization. As things stand, however, they might well be cited as evidence of a recent increase in popular piety -which actually may be the case! If we use 1800 as the benchmark, then church membership in Britain is substantially higher today.
In 1800 
SUBJECTIVE RELIGION AND POTENTLIAL DEMAND
Despite evidence of low levels of religious activity, many will reject the claim that medieval Europe, colonial New England, and pre-famine Ireland were highly secularized societies because it seems likely that the average person in each of these settings was in some general sense religious. That is, many people, perhaps even most of them, probably possessed some semblance of religious beliefs, even if these were somewhat vague and included as much magic and animism as Christianity. We entirely agree. Moreover, we interpret these mass religious tendencies as representing a potential demand for organized religion in these societies -potential in the sense that it awaited activation by aggressive suppliers. However, rather than restoring a benchmark of past piety against which to demonstrate the secularization of modern-day Europe, we think the same observation applies with equal force today. That is, the secularization thesis seems strong when measured in terms of participation in organized religion, but it seems false when religion is measured subjectively. Let us pursue this matter.
Because Iceland has often been proposed as the most secularized nation on earth (cf. Tomasson 1980), it seems an appropriate first case to consider. The claim that Iceland is extremely secularized is based on two observations: first, that church attendance is extremely low (about two percent attend weekly); and, second, that sexual norms are very liberalthese same standards have been used to define all the Scandinavian nations as secularized societies (Swatos 1984; Tomasson 1968). Nevertheless, William Swatos (1984) reported high levels of in-the-home religion in Iceland today, high rates of Baptism, and that nearly all weddings occur in church and "affirmations of personal immortality are typical" in newspaper obituaries, which usually are written by a close friend of the deceased rather than by a newswriter. This is not what one would expect of the world's most secularized society. Indeed, as shown in Table 1 , when asked "Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are a religious person?" 66% of Icelanders say "yes." Moreover, 75% of the 16. In 1656 Massachusetts officials learned that two Quaker women were aboard a ship anchored in Boston Harbor. The ship was boarded, the two were jailed, their books were confiscated, they were stripped naked and examined for signs of witchcraft, and then they were deported to Barbados. Several days later eight Quakers were detected on a another ship. They spent eleven weeks in jail and then were deported to England. In the aftermath of these events, the Colony passed a law that would fine a ship's master 100 pounds for bringing a Quaker to the Colony, impose a fine of 5 pounds on anyone caught with Quaker literature, and providing for the arrest, whipping, and deportation of any and all Quakers (Ahlstrom, 1975). Table 1 shows those nations of Europe that have been cited as the primary examples of secularized societies. On the basis of their low church attendance rates, especially in the Scandinavian nations, religion appears to be restricted to a small minority -perhaps involving only a "backward" remnant of the population, as so many have claimed (Wallace 1966; Wilson 1966 Wilson , 1982 ; Wallis 1986) But, the picture changes dramaticaUly when we examine subjective measures of individual faith. In each nation, the majority (often a very substantial majority) express belief in God, while convinced atheists are few. Moreover, except for Norway and Sweden, the majority of persons in each nation characterizes himself or herself as a "religious person."17 However, a decade later few Norwegians said they were "not religious" -as can be seen in Table 2 . These data cover fewer nations, but sustain the same conclusions. The contrasts in personal religiousness between the "secularized" nations and the "pious" nations are far less than the secularization theorists must expect. In all seven nations most people believe in life after death, and think the Bible is inspired by God, and fewer than a third regard themsleves as "not religious."
In our judgment these data fully justify the supply-side interpretation of Northern Europe's low levels of religious participation. The data show that potential demand varies little across these nations, so lack of demand cannot account for their low levels of religious participation. What varies is the vitality and variety of religious suppliers. It seems to us 17. There is a Bible in 90% of Swedish households (Hansson 1990). that it trivializes the concept of secularization to identify nations as secularized, when all that seems to be lacking is religious mobilization -a lack of active participation in organized religion. Indeed, it seems remarkable that such high levels of subjective faith can be found in nations where, for lack of church participation, organized religious socialization is largely lacking. In any event, if we shift our attention away from individual religiousness and back to religious organizations, the compelling question is what would happen to the levels of religious mobilization in these nations if or when they become fully deregulated and develop a set of vigorous religious firms? Our analysis implies that European nations eventually will display high levels of religious participation similar to those found in the United States and Canada. Confronted with a North American style religious economy -competitive, deregulated, and filled with a wide range of motivated suppliers -Europeans will respond as have their American and Canadian cousins. Before we address that issue directly, it will be instructive to summarize recent developments in Latin America. Until these books were published, the steady and rapid growth of pluralism in Latin America and the successful entry of highly competitive firms, had gone largely unnoticed in scholarly circles. Indeed, the scholarly world assumed that such changes were impossible. Some agreed that Catholic Liberation Theology had a bright future in Latin nations, but a successful outbreak of evangelical Protestantism was dismissed as absurd -hence the
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